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IS THE “JUNK” DNA DESIGNATION BUNK? 
Simon A. Cole∗ 
A recent exchange on the Colloquy between Professors Joh and Kaye1 
reflects a larger debate over civil liberties and DNA databases that has been 
raging for several years.2  In an essay drawing attention to the constitutional 
vacuum surrounding “abandoned” DNA—that is, DNA that we shed in 
public as we go about our daily lives—Joh raised a host of concerns about 
the proliferation of DNA databases, concerns that are heightened for “aban-
doned” DNA.  In response, Kaye suggested that some of Joh’s concerns 
constituted “science fiction.”  In this Colloquy Essay, I am primarily con-
cerned with only one of the several issues of dispute between Joh and Kaye:  
whether the genetic markers used in law enforcement databases, colloqui-
ally characterized as “junk DNA,” constitute a threat to privacy. 
Part I presents some background on the civil liberties debate over DNA 
databases.  In Part II, I seek to clarify the debate over the biological signifi-
cance of forensic genetic markers.  I conclude that, although Joh relied 
somewhat on innuendo by attributing potential biological function to foren-
sic STRs, Kaye, in his rebuttal, also overstated his argument by claiming 
that forensic DNA has no predictive value or medical significance.  At issue 
is what is meant by the term “medical significance.”  I hope to clarify the 
debate by drawing a sharp distinction between causal function and predic-
tive significance. 
In Part III, however, I suggest that the debate itself may have little sig-
nificance.  Whether or not a particular genetic marker “has predictive 
value” has a great deal to do with whether the relevant scientific actors 
choose to invest it with such value.  Therefore, even if forensic DNA con-
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2  See generally DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (David Lazer ed., 2004) (exploring the 
civil liberties implications of the development of DNA databases). 
 54 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY 
tains meaningful information, civil libertarians’ efforts to slow the spread of 
genetic databases by exaggerating the value of genetic information is likely 
to be counterproductive.  By hyping the supposed predictive value of all 
genetic information, civil libertarians may actually facilitate rather than 
forestall the spread of facile genetic determinism. 
I. THE DNA DATABASE DEBATE 
Civil libertarians worry about the inclusion of genetic information in 
law enforcement databases for several reasons, most hinging on an argu-
ment known as “genetic exceptionalism.”3  Adherents to this argument con-
tend that genetic information is more intimate and private than the 
information (such as biographical information, photographs, and finger-
prints) that is already routinely held in law enforcement databases and is 
generally not viewed as a threat to civil liberties.  Therefore, the storage of 
genetic information allegedly entails a greater violation of individual pri-
vacy than the storage of other forms of information. 
Genetic data, it is argued, contains intimate information about an indi-
vidual.  Privacy advocates contend that “DNA samples can provide insights 
into personal family relationships, disease predisposition, physical attrib-
utes, and ancestry.”4  Given this understanding of genetic information, civil 
libertarians and privacy advocates perceive a number of potential dangers 
from law enforcement storage of genetic information.  First, the govern-
ment itself may abuse the information stored in such databases, either 
through law enforcement agencies or through information leakage to other 
government agencies; after all, the memories of Japanese internment in the 
United States are not so old.5  A government agency ordered to round up 
individuals of a certain ethnic descent could, conceivably, perform ancestry 
testing on a genetic database to automate the process.6  Somewhat more 
speculatively, if a (real or spurious) genetic basis for criminal behavior were 
established, the government could seek to round up those individuals pos-
sessing the genetic stigma.7 
Even if the government itself were not inclined to abuse the informa-
tion, the database may present a target for malefactors (or entrepreneurs) in-
terested in the information.  Perhaps the most salient threat is that 
employers or health insurers would want access to genetic information in 
 
3  See George Annas, Genetic Privacy, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 2, 
at 135– 36; Elizabeth E. Joh, supra note 1, at 873. 
4  Tania Simoncelli, Dangerous Excursions:  The Case Against Expanding Forensic DNA Databases 
to Innocent Persons, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 392 (2006). 
5  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (U.S. 1944) (link). 
6  See, e,.g., Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69:  A Dangerous 
Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279,  288 (2005). 
7  Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in Law Enforcement:  What 
Role for Privacy?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 158 (2006). 
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order to mine it for disease propensity, potentially leading to “genetic dis-
crimination.”8  Although there are a number of state statues banning such 
discrimination and a federal statute under consideration,9 such statutes 
could someday be repealed. 
II. ON “JUNK DNA” 
The databases, however, are only as dangerous as the genetic data 
stored in them.  What information is stored in a DNA database? Thirteen 
loci (locations on the human genome) known as single tandem repeats, or 
“STRs,” are examined to produce the DNA profiles that are standard for da-
tabases in the United States.10  At each locus, people have two “alleles,” re-
peating sequences of DNA base pairs; one is maternally inherited, one 
paternally.  The numbers of repeats vary across individuals.  A DNA pro-
file, which is what is stored in a DNA database, is simply a list of the num-
ber of repeats found in each of the two copies of the repeating sequence for 
each locus. 
Early in the debate over DNA typing, the loci used in law enforcement 
DNA testing were popularly characterized as lacking any particular biologi-
cal function; they were commonly labeled “junk DNA.”  Among biologists 
the term “junk” was quickly replaced by “non-coding,” but the colloquial-
ism has stuck.  The term is unfortunate because, as Kaye points out, there 
are several different biological entities that fall under the label “junk 
DNA,”11 and also because, as Joh points out, much “junk DNA” is now be-
lieved to have a function.12  Furthermore, this terminology conflates two 
different issues.  In one sense, “junk DNA” implies a lack of biological 
function—that the DNA doesn’t do anything.  This is the current under-
standing with regard to the STRs used in forensic profiling.  Although bi-
ologists are discovering functions for some types of “junk DNA,”13 none 
have yet claimed that the forensic STRs do function.  In another sense, 
however, the term “junk” implies an absence of meaning—that forensic 
STRs are essentially empty information devoid of biological significance.  
But the two issues are distinct:  a biological marker may be significant, in 
 
8  See Barry Steinhardt, Privacy and Forensic DNA Data Banks, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 173, 182. 
9  Seth Axelrad, Survey of State DNA Database Statutes (2005), available at 
http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/guide.pdf (link). 
10  These 13 STRs are sometimes called the CODIS STRs because they are the STRs used by the 
Combined DNA Index System administered by the FBI.  All U.S. DNA databases use these CODIS 
STRs in order to be compatible with FBI standards. 
11  Kaye, supra note 1, at 64. 
12  Joh, supra note 1, at 870. 
13  See, e.g., Richard Ingham, Landmark Study Prompts DNA Rethink, DISCOVERY CHANNEL, June 
14, 2007, http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2007/06/14/genetics_hea_print.html (link); Colin Nickerson, 
DNA Study Challenges Basic Ideas in Genetics:  Genome ‘Junk’ Appears Essential, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 14, 2007; Kaye, supra note 1, at 64-65. 
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that it indicates a propensity for physical traits, but not functional, in that it 
does not cause those physical traits.  
In the debate over DNA databases the term “junk DNA” has been in-
voked by defenders of the databases to blunt privacy concerns.14  Their ar-
gument is that, since forensic STRs are non-functional “junk,” the genetic 
data stored in databases is meaningless.  Therefore, there are no privacy 
concerns regarding DNA profiles.  What this argument misses is that foren-
sic STRs may have significance, even if they do not function, so there still 
may be reason for privacy concerns.  For instance, if a particular allele at 
one of the CODIS loci correlates with certain physical traits, knowledge of 
an individual’s allele at that locus could help predict whether that individual 
will develop that disease even if that allele plays no role in actually causing 
those physical traits.15 
In Professor Joh’s Essay about the practice of law enforcement seizure 
of “abandoned” DNA she argued that the claim that forensic STRs have no 
significance was disingenuous.16  Joh argued that abandoned DNA should 
be afforded greater legal protection than, say, abandoned fingerprints be-
cause of the greater intrusiveness of genetic information.  In response to da-
tabase advocates’ contention that DNA profiles contain only innocuous 
information, Joh cited several scientific reports debunking claims that vari-
ous types of DNA labeled “junk” have no biological function.17  This was 
 
14  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term—Foreword:  The Document and the 
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 126 (2000) (link) (“[T]here is a clean way of protecting private infor-
mation of this sort [disease predisposition] by using only part of the DNA code, so-called ‘junk DNA,’ 
that only identifies a person but tells us nothing truly private—the DNA equivalent of a fingerprint.”); 
Lisa Schriner Lewis, The Role Genetic Information Plays in the Criminal Justice System, 47 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 519, 523 (2005) (link) (“[T]he use of junk or non-coding sequences means that while the obtained 
genetic profile can distinguish individuals, it does not reveal physical traits or genetic predisposition to 
diseases or conditions.”); Randall S. Murch & Bruce Budowle, Are Developments in Forensic Applica-
tions of DNA Technology Consistent with Privacy Protections?, in GENETIC SECRETS:  PROTECTING 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 212, 224 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (“The 
predisposition of a donor to one or more genetically induced conditions is generally not retrievable from 
forensic genetic data; only the potential for the individualization of a donor to the exclusion of all others 
(or an exclusion of the evidence sample) by the genetic information can be obtained.”) 
15  It should be noted, however, that the debate over the biological significance of DNA profiles is 
somewhat of a distraction from the larger issue of the threat to privacy posed by the banking of DNA 
samples.  In every U.S. state except Wisconsin, the state is permitted to store the original biological 
samples, containing the full complement of genetic information.  Tania Simoncelli, supra note 4, at 392.  
Even those who are sanguine about the privacy threat posed by profiles are concerned about the storage 
of samples.  Michael E. Smith, Let’s Make the DNA Identification Database as Inclusive as Possible, 34 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 385, 387 (2006). 
16  Joh, supra note 1, at 870. 
17  Id. at n.74. 
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not the first time someone had claimed that the “junk” designation for the 
CODIS STRs might be overblown.18 
In his reply, Professor Kaye pointed out that there are a great many dif-
ferent types of non-coding DNA, of which the CODIS STRs are just one.19  
He explained that the scientific reports cited by Joh concerned other types 
of non-coding DNA, not the CODIS STRs,20 argued that “Joh’s account 
sweeps all noncoding DNA under the same rug,”21 and accused Joh of “al-
ter[ing]” one scientific report concerning non-coding DNA to appear to re-
fer to STRs when, in fact, it referred to a different type of non-coding 
DNA.22  The scientific report that suggested the junk DNA designation 
“may well go down as one of the biggest mistakes in the history of molecu-
lar biology” was discussing “the possibility that the intervening noncoding 
sequences may be transmitting parallel information in the form of RNA 
molecules.”23  Kaye argued, “It is a leap from this possibility to the conclu-
sion that the forensic STRs—which do not generate RNA molecules and are 
not conserved across species—are functional or . . . will prove useful for 
predicting disease.”24  Moreover, Kaye notes, “no forensic STR locus has 
been found to be predictive.”25 
Kaye persuasively demonstrates that Joh may have been over-inclusive 
in her conceptualization of non-coding DNA.  Certainly, it is plausible that 
a legal scholar lacking the sophisticated understanding of genetics that Kaye 
clearly wields may overlook the nuances that he describes.  However, 
Kaye’s conclusion, that “any claim that the DNA profiles currently used for 
identification constitute ‘predictive medical information’ is false,”26 seems 
to paint with an equally broad brush. 
In particular, Kaye’s source for his assertion that “no forensic STR lo-
cus has been found to be predictive,” an article by John Butler, supports that 
statement.27  But, several paragraphs later, Butler says the following:  
Colin Kimpton et al. and coworkers from the European DNA Profiling Group 
recognized early on in the application of STRs for human identity testing that 
“it is likely that many or possibly most STRs will eventually be shown to be 
useful in following a genetic disease or other genetic trait within a family and 
 
18  See,e.g., Pamela Sankar, DNA-Typing:  Galton’s Eugenic Dream Realized?, in DOCUMENTING 
INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 273, 285–86 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001); Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 
173. 
19  Kaye, supra note 1, at 64.  
20  Id. at 65. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. (emphasis added). 
25  Id. at 64. 
26  Id. at 62–63. 
27  See id. 64; John M. Butler, Genetics and Genomics of Core Short Tandem Repeat Loci Used in 
Human Identity Testing, 51 J. FORENSIC SCI. 253, 260  (2006). 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/23/ 58 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY 
therefore this possibility must be recognized at the outset of the use of such 
systems.” 
 Indeed, a number of the core STR loci described in this review have been 
reported to be useful in tracking various genetic diseases through loss of het-
erozygosity or allelic imbalance.28 
This means that even though the forensic STRs don’t, as far as we 
know, cause disease, they correlate with the genes (or assortments of genes) 
that do, and thus may be useful for tracking which individuals have the dis-
ease-causing genes.  Essentially, Butler claims that the STRs are useful in 
“following” or “tracking” genetic disease.  Whether or not the medical 
community ultimately chooses to use forensic STRs or some other genetic 
test to screen for any particular disease, it is misleading to claim that foren-
sic STRs have no medical significance, are devoid of information, or are 
completely innocuous from a privacy standpoint. 
If this is the case, then Kaye’s claim that there is currently no plausible 
theory supporting the idea that STRs might be predictive of disease is not 
fully informative.  Butler states that some forensic STRs are already predic-
tive, though not causal, of disease, and more may ultimately turn out to be.  
Predictive relationships are not necessarily causal, as Kaye understands as 
well as anyone.29  Just as Joh’s account elides the distinction between dif-
ferent kinds of non-coding DNA, Kaye’s elides the distinction between 
causal and predictive significance. 
The debate can perhaps be clarified by distinguishing more sharply be-
tween function and significance.  Joh imputed function to forensic STRs on 
the basis of functionality claims that pertain to other types of non-coding 
DNA.  Kaye, in debunking the functionality of forensic STRs, simultane-
ously dismisses their significance.30  But the significance, if not the func-
tionality, of forensic STRs remains.  Forensic STRs are potentially 
significant because they may turn out to be useful for predicting physical 
traits. 
Therefore, forensic STRs may, in fact, be precisely the kind of “predic-
tive medical information” that concerns privacy advocates.  This state of af-
fairs may not raise enormous privacy issues, especially compared to DNA 
samples, but it does not render forensic STRs immune to privacy concerns, 
either.  Joh is correct that claims that forensic STRs “cannot reveal medical 
information”31 are overblown, although not quite for the reasons she stated.  
The claims are overblown not because STRs have causal functions, but be-
cause they may have predictive utility.  Under such circumstances, dismis-
 
28  Id. at 260 (quoting Colin Kimpton et al., Report on the Second EDNAP Collaborative STR Exer-
cise, 71 FORESNIC SCI. INT’L 137 (1995). 
29  DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND RESEARCH 
ISSUES, 135 (2002). 
30  Supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
31  Joh, supra note 1, at 870. 
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sive statements that forensic STRs “tell[] us nothing truly private,”32 “have 
no meaning except as a representation of molecular sequences at . . . loci 
that are not indicative of an individual’s personal traits or propensities,”33 
“are not socially or medically significant,”34 “reveal nothing about propen-
sities to disease, behavioral traits, or the like,”35 are “like fingerprints or li-
cense plate numbers . . . only useful for identification purposes,”36 or that a 
DNA profile “is very much like a social security number—though it is 
longer and is assigned by chance, not by the federal government” and “can 
tell nothing about a person”37 elide the distinction between causal function 
and associative utility.  Such statements seem overbroad given that Kaye 
agrees that forensic STRs can be and are used to track disease.  If not down-
right misleading, such statements at least have a high likelihood of being 
misunderstood by the lay public, and even by scholars, to mean that foren-
sic STRs have no biological significance whatsoever and therefore pose no 
privacy threat, when they do and they may.38  
III. ON GENETIC EXCEPTIONALISM 
All that being said, I am not a genetic exceptionalist.  In fact, I believe 
that about the worst thing we can do in the debates over the use of forensic 
genetic information is attribute exaggerated predictive powers to genes.  I 
 
32  Amar, supra note 14. 
33  David H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Databases for Law Enforcement:  The Coverage Ques-
tion and the Case for a Population-Wide Database, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra 
note 2, at 247, 256. 
34  D.H. Kaye, Who Needs Special Needs?  On the Constitutionality of Collecting DNA and Other 
Biometric Data from Arrestees, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 188, 194 (2006). 
35  Id. (emphasis added). 
36  Interview by telephone Congressional Quarterly with David Kaye (Sept. 16, 2003), available at 
http://www.law.asu.edu/?id=8606 (link).  Kaye’s use of the fingerprint analogy is complicated because 
Kaye recognizes the little known point that fingerprints are not devoid of hereditary information, albeit 
not particularly useful information.  See infra note 42 and accompanying text.  Thus, when Kaye calls 
something (like a DNA locus) “as meaningless as fingerprints,” David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About 
DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179, 188 (2001) (link), he may not necessar-
ily mean that it actually is meaningless, only that it has little meaning.  However, it must be recognized 
that most lay readers and policymakers and not a few scholars, inculcated in the popular view that fin-
gerprints are empty signifiers, would read such an assertion to mean that the DNA locus is truly “mean-
ingless.” 
37  D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:  Legality, Legitimacy, and the 
Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 431 (2003).  See also Michael E. Smith, 
Let’s Make the DNA Identification Database as Inclusive as Possible, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 385, 387 
(2006).  
38  Kaye’s view appears to be that we need not sound alarms unless we can foresee a clear pathway 
toward diagnostic uses of forensic STRs.  Since such a pathway is not clear at this point in time, he sees 
little point in alarming the public, perhaps unnecessarily.  This is perhaps simply a difference in policy 
preference, but I would tend to err on the side of informing the public of the potential risks.  My view is 
largely informed by my sense that Kaye’s subtle understanding of the science is likely to be misread as 
claiming that forensic STRs are completely meaningless and innocuous. 
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have elsewhere cautioned libertarian leaning scholars against endorsing the 
predictive power of genes, even when attempting to alert people about the 
potential abuses of forensic genetic technologies.39  I believe that the ideol-
ogy of genetic determinism poses a greater threat to liberty than does the 
technology of DNA databanking, and I could not make this point better than 
Kaye does when he writes, “[a] warrant requirement will not make much 
difference to a society that, under the sway of a naive and discredited theory 
of genetic determinism, is willing to lock people away on the basis of their 
genes.”40 
One reason that I am not a genetic exceptionalist is because genetic ex-
ceptionalism incorrectly portrays fingerprints as devoid of hereditary in-
formation.  As I have argued elsewhere, the widespread view of fingerprints 
as devoid of information stems from a social decision not to invest in re-
search exploring correlations between fingerprint patterns and race, ethnic-
ity, disease, and behavioral propensities, not from a biological absence of 
such correlations.41  In other words, it is not true that fingerprint patterns 
cannot be correlated with perceived ethnicity or even disease or behavioral 
characteristics.  It is simply that we, as a society, have chosen not to make 
much of these correlations.  Kaye is among the few scholars to correctly 
understand this admittedly counterintuitive point,42 and he is correct when 
he notes that “Joh’s assertion that fingerprints ‘cannot reveal any more in-
formation [than identity] about the person from whom they have been col-
lected’ is mistaken.”43 
Thus, when we speak of “predictive medical value,” we are actually 
speaking of correlations, and all sorts of somatic markers may have causal 
or non-causal correlations with all sorts of biological attributes:  ancestry, 
disease, behavioral propensity, and the like.  Some genetic markers have 
stronger correlations than fingerprint patterns, but the apparent “strength” of 
biological correlations derives only in part from nature.  The strength of 
these correlations also reflects society’s decision to invest scientific re-
sources toward finding such correlations.  Even though the strength of a 
particular correlation may be statistical fact, the strength of known correla-
tions is to some extent a social fact, in that it is dependent on how and in 
what areas research investments are made in order to develop the strongest 
possible correlations.  Today, of course, we invest heavily in genetic corre-
lations—and little in fingerprint correlations. 
In this sense, it is somewhat misguided for us to debate whether or not 
genetic information “has” predictive value because, to some extent, the an-
 
39  Simon A. Cole, The Myth of Fingerprints, 19 GENEWATCH 6, (Nov.–Dec., 2006). 
40  Kaye, supra note 1, at 66. 
41  See SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES:  A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL 
IDENTIFICATION, 100–01 (2001). 
42  David H. Kaye, supra note 36, at 185. 
43  Kaye, supra note 1, at 64. 
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swer will be determined by how hard we as a society try to impute predic-
tive value to that genetic information.  This is why I am worried about the 
increasing use of forensic DNA technology:  not because I think that “junk 
DNA” has predictive value, but because I am worried that the widespread 
collection and social investment in such information will provide an irre-
sistible temptation to treat it as if it does have such value.  And the tempta-
tion will be to construct correlations along lines that have social 
resonance—which is to say, especially in the realm of criminal justice in the 
U.S. today, along racial lines. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because of this temptation, Kaye’s “optimistic” future in which “re-
searchers will find alleles associated with propensities such as risk-taking 
that are more common in some groups than others, but such alleles will not 
be unique to any group” and, therefore, will not implicate race, is somewhat 
naïve.44  Professor Duster, for example, argues that researchers will be more 
likely to exploit group differences that pertain to socially resonant catego-
ries like race than non-resonant categories.  Thus, even if stigmatized alleles 
are not unique to any group, variations in their appearance in different racial 
groups may still be exploited to suggest racial correlations with medical or 
behavioral propensities.45  Genetic exceptionalism, despite its best inten-
tions, does not forestall such a future; it facilitates it. 
One example of this can even be found for the forensic STRs.  Pheno-
typic profiling, the prediction of the “race” of an unknown perpetrator, is al-
ready being used in criminal investigations.46  This practice, which Kaye 
has found constitutionally unobjectionable47 and, at least potentially, “statis-
tically valid,”48 would seem to belie the conception of forensic STRs as 
“not socially or medically significant.”49  They “predict race.”  Of course, 
“race” is not thought to have any coherent biological meaning, so what they 
really predict is phenotypically perceived race or what Professor 
Hammonds calls “embodied” race.50  But, through “race,” we are back to 
disease prediction because of the current resurrection of race in biomedical 
 
 Sociology, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 10 (2006). 
 (2006). 
mwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing:  Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L 
REV
44  Kaye, supra note 1, at 67. 
45  Troy Duster, Comparative Perspectives and Competing Explanations:  Taking on the Newly Con-
figured Reductionist Challenge to
46  See, e.g., Pilar N. Ossorio, About Face:  Forensic Genetic Testing for Race and Visible Traits, 34 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 277
47  Edward J. I
. 413, 449 (2001). 
48  Id. at 450. 
49  D.H. Kaye, supra note 34, at 194. 
50  Evelynn M. Hammonds, New Technologies of Race, in PROCESSED LIVES:  GENDER AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 107 (Terry and Calvert eds., 1997).   
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research.51  In short, “junk DNA,” like “race,” may lack biological meaning 
but have plenty of social meaning.  Under such circumstances, it is a far cry 
to call it “junk.” 
The privacy threat posed by forensic STRs may not be great.  How-
ever, if citizens concerned about genetic privacy are being asked to make 
policy decisions about the implementation of genetic databases, they should 
be clearly and completely informed about the potential privacy risks posed 
by forensic genetic databases.  Calling forensic STRs “junk,” “not socially 
or medically significant,”52 or “as meaningless as fingerprints”53 does not 
inform clearly or completely.  If some forensic STRs are correlated with 
genes that cause physical traits, though they do not cause the physical traits 
themselves, the public can be informed of that fact. The public can decide 
for itself whether and to what extent the privacy risk offsets the benefits of 
genetic databases.  Blending a relative lack of risk into a claim of no risk at 
all may reassure the public in the short term, but in the long term, as the 
blurring of the facts becomes known, will only breed misunderstanding and 
mistrust. 
 
51  E.g., Duster supra note 45; JENNY REARDON, RACE TO THE FINISH: IDENTITY AND GOVERNANCE 
IN THE AGE OF GENOMICS (2005); Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes ‘Ethnic’:  Law, Commerce, 
and the Production of Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2004); 
Michael J. Montoya, Bioethnic Conscription:  Genes, Race, and Mexicana/o Ethnicity in Diabetes Re-
search, 22 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 94 (2007). 
52  D.H. Kaye, supra note 34, at 194. 
53   David H. Kaye, supra note 36, at 188. 
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